I've been through multiple GitHub Actions security incidents, including supply chain attacks like the CodeCov breach that compromised thousands of repositories. GitHub Actions is about as secure as leaving your laptop unlocked at DEF CON. It was built for open source projects, not enterprises that need to prove they're not complete fucking idiots to auditors. When popular CI/CD tools get compromised and leak AWS keys, it's not a surprise - it's what happens when you trust random marketplace code with production access.
Why GitHub Actions Fails Every Security Audit
GitHub's marketplace is malware distribution with extra steps: I've seen actions with names like "ultimate-security-scanner" that were actually credential harvesters. Dealt with this shit multiple times - actions that looked legit with thousands of downloads, but were stealing secrets. One particularly nasty one was posting our .env
contents to some Telegram channel. NIST's Secure Software Development Framework specifically warns against this shit, but GitHub promotes it as a feature.
RBAC that makes auditors snort with laughter: GitHub gives you repository permissions and calls it enterprise security. You can't restrict who deploys to production, can't require approval workflows, and can't implement basic segregation of duties. I've sat in audit meetings where the compliance officer just stared at GitHub's permission model and said "that's it?"
Audit logs that don't audit shit: When your auditor asks "who approved this prod deployment that leaked customer data?" GitHub Actions shrugs and points to a basic activity log. Meanwhile, you're explaining why your CI/CD platform can't answer basic compliance questions that Jenkins could handle in 2010.
OIDC configuration that's more confusing than a Perl one-liner: GitHub's OIDC implementation is designed to trip you up. The trust policy syntax is so goddamn confusing that even senior engineers fuck it up regularly. Tinder's security team showed how one wrong StringLike
instead of StringEquals
gives any repo in your org access to production AWS. I spent like 3 days debugging this shit where a test repo was calling our prod Lambda functions because someone fat-fingered the trust policy - maybe 72 hours total?
Teams That Got Burned Are Switching
After getting burned three times by GitHub Actions security holes, teams are switching to platforms that actually pass audits:
GitLab CI/CD actually has SOC 2 Type II certification that covers their CI/CD platform specifically, not just their hosting. When auditors ask about vulnerability scanning, GitLab just works instead of requiring you to bolt on external tools.
Azure DevOps works great if you're already drinking the Microsoft Kool-Aid. Their FedRAMP compliance through Azure Government is real, and their branch policies actually enforce approvals instead of just suggesting them.
CircleCI is boring but it works, unlike GitHub's security theater. They got FedRAMP authorization back in 2018 when GitHub was still figuring out what security meant. When government auditors visit, they recognize CircleCI - they've never heard of half the GitHub Actions marketplace.
Migration Sucks But Failed Audits Suck Worse
I've seen SOC 2 audit failures delay $50M deals because the security team couldn't explain why our CI/CD platform trusted random marketplace code. GDPR violations can cost 4% of global revenue - and GitHub Actions makes those violations more likely, not less.
When GitHub's own security guide tells you to use external tools for basic security features, you know the platform wasn't designed for enterprise use.
The tj-actions attack was a preview of what happens when you build CI/CD on trust-random-assholes-on-the-internet architecture. Teams that care about keeping their jobs during audit season are switching to platforms designed by people who understand security, not convenience.