Docker Container Escape Vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-9074 & CVE-2025-3224 - AI Technical Reference

Critical Vulnerabilities Overview

CVE-2025-9074: Docker Desktop Container Escape

• Affected Systems: Docker Desktop on Windows/macOS (Linux Docker Engine unaffected)
• Fixed Version: Docker Desktop 4.44.3+ (July 2025)
• Attack Vector: Containers access Docker Engine API at 192.168.65.7:2375
• Bypass Capability: Enhanced Container Isolation provides no protection
• Impact Severity: Complete host system compromise from any container

CVE-2025-3224: Windows Privilege Escalation

• Affected Systems: Docker Desktop on Windows only
• Fixed Version: Docker Desktop 4.41.0+ (April 2025)
• Attack Vector: Symbolic link manipulation during update process
• Exploit Window: During Docker Desktop updates
• Impact Severity: SYSTEM-level privilege escalation

Attack Mechanics

CVE-2025-9074 Technical Details

# Attack signature - containers accessing Docker daemon
curl http://192.168.65.7:2375/containers/json

# Privilege escalation command from within container
docker run --privileged -v /:/host alpine sh

Critical Failure Points:

• Docker daemon runs as root (by design)
• Internal networking bypass of socket restrictions
• Works regardless of security settings
• Attack appears as legitimate Docker API usage

CVE-2025-3224 Technical Details

Target Directory: C:\ProgramData\Docker\config
Attack Method: Junction point redirection during cleanup operations
Timing: Docker Desktop update process privilege escalation

Detection Specifications

Real-Time Monitoring Requirements

Network Traffic Patterns:

• Monitor connections to 192.168.65.7:2375 from containers
• Alert on internal Docker subnet traffic to daemon ports
• Capture evidence: tcpdump -i any host 192.168.65.7 and port 2375

Docker API Monitoring:

# Enable debug logging (50MB/hour log volume)
sudo systemctl edit docker
# Add: ExecStart=/usr/bin/dockerd --debug

# Monitor suspicious API calls
sudo journalctl -u docker.service -f | grep -E "(POST|PUT|DELETE).*(containers|images)"

Container Behavior Analysis:

• Privileged containers created unexpectedly
• Host filesystem mounts (-v /:/host)
• API capability additions (--cap-add)

Detection Tool Configuration

Falco Rule for Container Escapes:

- rule: Container Accessing Docker Socket
  desc: Detect container accessing Docker daemon socket
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container and
    fd.name contains "/var/run/docker.sock" or
    fd.name contains "192.168.65.7:2375"
  output: >
    Container accessed Docker daemon 
    (user=%user.name container=%container.name 
     command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
  priority: CRITICAL

Windows Event Monitoring:

# Docker privilege escalation detection
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4672} | Where-Object {$_.Message -match "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege"}

Mitigation Strategies

Network Isolation

# Block Docker daemon access from containers
iptables -A DOCKER-USER -s 172.20.0.0/16 -d 192.168.65.7 -j DROP
iptables -A DOCKER-USER -p tcp --dport 2375 -j DROP
iptables -A DOCKER-USER -p tcp --dport 2376 -j DROP

Container Hardening

# Minimal privilege configuration
docker run --cap-drop ALL --cap-add NET_BIND_SERVICE --read-only --tmpfs /tmp app_image

# User namespace remapping (breaks some applications)
echo '{"userns-remap": "default"}' > /etc/docker/daemon.json
systemctl restart docker

Known Application Breaks with User Namespace Remapping:

• NPM packages writing to system directories
• Database containers expecting specific UIDs
• File upload features depending on host filesystem permissions
• Django log directory write permissions
• MySQL container startup failures

Image Security

# Secure base image selection
FROM gcr.io/distroless/java:11  # No shell access for attackers
# NOT: FROM ubuntu:20.04        # Full toolchain available

Incident Response Procedures

Immediate Containment

# Emergency container isolation
docker network disconnect bridge [container_name]
docker pause [container_name]

# Evidence preservation
docker commit [container_name] evidence_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
docker logs [container_name] > breach_logs_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).txt

# Nuclear option - stop Docker daemon (kills all containers)
sudo systemctl stop docker

Forensic Data Collection

# Critical evidence gathering
sudo journalctl -u docker.service --since "1 hour ago" > docker_logs.log
docker export suspicious_container > container_filesystem.tar
docker system info > docker_system_info.txt

Production Environment Impact Assessment

Version Compatibility Issues

• Docker Desktop 4.42.x: Networking failures
• Docker Desktop 4.43.0: Memory leaks on M1 Macs (Intel unaffected)
• Docker Desktop 4.44.2: Enhanced Container Isolation broken
• Docker Desktop 4.44.3: Stable fix version

Supply Chain Risk

Development Environment Compromise:

• Compromised images built on vulnerable Docker Desktop
• Production deployment of tainted containers
• Registry pollution from compromised development machines

Resource Requirements

Monitoring Implementation Costs

• Falco setup: 1 week tuning (high false positive rate initially)
• Debug logging: 50MB/hour storage overhead
• Network monitoring: Dedicated packet capture infrastructure
• SIEM integration: Forward container events to centralized logging

Alternative Solutions

Docker Desktop Replacements:

• Colima (macOS/Linux)
• Rancher Desktop (cross-platform)
• Podman Desktop (Red Hat alternative)
• Native Docker Engine (Linux only)

Operational Intelligence

Attack Timeline Expectations

• Container compromise to host access: ~20 minutes
• Data exfiltration window: Immediate post-compromise
• Detection lag: Often hours due to insufficient monitoring

False Security Assumptions

• Enhanced Container Isolation provides no protection against CVE-2025-9074
• Socket mounting restrictions bypassed by internal networking
• Standard APM tools (Datadog, New Relic) don't monitor Docker daemon API
• Container resource monitoring doesn't detect privilege escalation

Real-World Breach Patterns

1. Initial container compromise via application vulnerability
2. Discovery of Docker daemon API accessibility
3. Privileged container creation with host filesystem access
4. Credential harvesting from mounted host directories
5. Lateral movement using extracted credentials
6. Persistence mechanism installation

Critical Warning Indicators

Immediate Threats

• Containers accessing 192.168.65.7:2375
• Unexpected privileged container creation
• Host filesystem mounts in unplanned containers
• Docker API calls from container processes

System Compromise Indicators

• Mystery containers in docker ps -a
• Network connections to Docker daemon ports from containers
• Privilege escalation events during Docker updates
• File system changes in Docker configuration directories

Configuration Validation

Version Check Scripts

# Vulnerability assessment
if [ "$(docker version --format '{{.Client.Version}}' | sed 's/\.//g')" -lt 4443 ]; then
    echo "CRITICAL: Vulnerable to CVE-2025-9074"
    exit 1
fi

Security Hardening Verification

# Container privilege audit
docker ps --filter "label=privileged=true"
docker inspect $(docker ps -q) | jq '.[] | select(.HostConfig.Privileged==true or .HostConfig.CapAdd!=null)'

# Network isolation verification
iptables -L DOCKER-USER

This technical reference provides actionable intelligence for automated security systems and human operators defending against Docker container escape vulnerabilities.